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9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA	
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12	CHARLES SHANK,	Case No. C04-5843RJB
13	Plaintiff,	
14	V.	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ISSUE A NEW
15	RANDY CASTEEL; CHRIS ENDRESEN; JON BRAND; and MALCOLM FLEMING,	SCHEDULING ORDER OR TO STRIKE ALL OF DEFENDANTS'
16	Defendants.	AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND EXTENDING SETTLEMENT
17		AND MEDIATION DEADLINES
18	This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Issue a New Scheduling Order or to	
19	Strike All of Defendants' Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. 57). The court has considered the pleadings filed in	
20	support of and in opposition to the motion and the file herein.	
21	I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	
22	Mr. Shank's amended complaint alleges that he is entitled to punitive and other damages under	
23	42. U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 for violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth	
24	Amendments; that the defendants violated his rights under RCW 42.41.010; and that the defendants are	
25	liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 21. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss,	
26	and the court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. Dkt. 24. The plaintiff's claims	

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brought under RCW 42.41.010 and his claim for emotional distress were dismissed, as were defendants Kitsap County and Messrs. Furuta and Yingling. Dkt. 24.

The parties conferred and agreed that the plaintiff would file a second amended complaint to reflect the order dismissing certain claims and defendants and that the defendants would wait and answer only the second amended complaint. Dkt. 66 at 2. On September 29, 2005, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Dkt. 54. The plaintiff did not seek leave from the court and did not indicate that the parties had stipulated to the filing of a second amended complaint. See id. Counsel for the defendants did not review or stipulate to the second amended complaint filed with the court. Dkt. 66 at 4. The court held that the filing did not comply with Federal Rule 15(a) and that the document would remain in the electronic file but would not be considered by the court, would not require an answer from the defendants, and would not supercede the first amended complaint. Dkt. 55.

The parties again conferred. While counsel for the defendants was amenable to stipulating to a second amended complaint, the parties agreed that the defendants would answer the first amended complaint and that the plaintiff would not file another amended complaint. Dkt. 66 at 5.

The discovery deadline was initially scheduled for September 25 but was reset for October 25, upon the plaintiff's unopposed motion. See Dkt. 27, 47, 52, 53. During this one month extension, it appears that counsel for the plaintiff made one discovery attempt; he contacted counsel for the defendants one day before the new cutoff date and asked to dispose David Smith and the defendants. Dkt. 66 at 5. Counsel for the defendants refused to participate in discovery after the deadline without leave of the court and indicated that the defendants were unlikely to agree to another extension of the discovery deadline. Id. This appears to be the only discovery attempt made by plaintiff's counsel since April 22, 2005. Dkt. 66 at 6. The answer to the amended complaint was filed on October 26, 2005, the day after the extended discovery deadline. Dkt. 56.

The answer to the amended complaint states several affirmative defenses, which may be summarized as follows: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) contributory fault by third parties; (3) immunity; (4) contributory fault by the plaintiff; (5) failure to mitigate; (6) statute of limitations; (7) lack of causation; (8) misjoinder; (9) frivolousness of the action; (10) lack of 
liability under § 1983 under *respondeat superior*; (11) privilege; (12) unfounded and non-meritorious action entitling the defendants to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; (13) malicious prosecution; (14) failure to exhaust remedies; (15) lawful and faithful discharge of duties; (16) waiver; and (17) estoppel. Dkt. 56.

The plaintiff now moves the court to issue a new scheduling order or in the alternative, to strike the defendants' affirmative defenses. Dkt. 57. The parties have also stipulated to an order continuing mediation under Local Rule CR 39.1 until after the parties have filed dispositive motions and papers in support of and in opposition to such motions, subject to the court's ruling on the motion for a new scheduling order. Dkt. 58.

## II. DISCUSSION

## A. NEW SCHEDULING ORDER

The grounds upon which Mr. Shank appears to move for a new scheduling order or for the striking of the defendants' affirmative defenses is the "plaintiff's inability to engage in discovery regarding these complaints." Dkt. 57 at 1. The defendants oppose the motion, contending that any delay in notifying the plaintiff of the affirmative defenses was either caused or agreed to by the plaintiff. Dkt. 65 at 2. They further contend that having "expended considerable time, effort, and expense to prepare their case," they would be prejudiced by a continuance. Dkt. 65 at 5.

While it is true that the defendants have asserted numerous affirmative defenses, this does not justify a continuance of the case. The affirmative defenses are all grounded upon aspects of a case that any reasonable attorney should anticipate and prepare for before even filing a complaint. A reasonably prudent attorney would make these possible defenses the subject of discovery without waiting for opposing counsel to flag the issues. The failure to conduct discovery on these issues cannot be fairly attributed to a delayed filing of the answer. Furthermore, the delay in the filing of the answer was agreed to by the parties.

## B. CONTINUATION OF SETTLEMENT AND MEDIATION DEADLINES

The parties have stipulated to an extension of the deadlines for holding a settlement conference and mediation. Dkt. 58. The parties apparently seek to extend the settlement conference deadline, which

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is currently November 24, 2005, to January 4, 2006. Dkt. 58 at 2 (originally listed as January 4, 2004). They also seek to extend the deadline for holding mediation, which is currently set for December 24, 2005, to January 11, 2006. Dkt. 27 (originally listed as January 11, 2005). In order to facilitate further efforts to resolve this case, the court should grant the motion and extend the deadlines for holding a settlement conference and mediation.

## III. ORDER

Therefore it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Issue a New Scheduling Order or to Strike All of Defendants' Affirmative Defenses (Dkt.57) is DENIED. The deadline for holding a settlement conference shall be extended to January 4, 2006. The deadline for holding mediation shall be January 11, 2006. The deadline for filing a letter of compliance as to CR 39.1 shall be January 13, 2006. The other deadlines set forth in the court's Minute Order Setting Trial, Pretrial Dates and Ordering Mediation (Dkt. 27) as modified by court order (Dkt. 53) shall remain in full force and effect.

The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and to any party appearing *pro se* at said party's last known address.

DATED this 12<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2005.

Robert J. Bryan

United States. District Judge

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